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The fact that certain educators and psychologists (assuming that there is any 
difference between the two ) believe that happiness lessons are a good idea is 
simultaneously bizarre whilst being utterly in keeping with current orthodoxies. I 
make this claim, because during my experience as an English teacher, we were pretty 
much told that every lesson ought to be a happiness lesson. By this, I mean that every 
lesson ought to be fast paced (preventing boredom), that it should accommodate 
different kinds of learner kinaesthetic, auditory and visual (those students with ants in 
their pants will get to shake off those ants). All areas being taught should be 
scaffolded so that students would feel comfortable with what they were learning in 
order that emotional scarring would not result from their confusion and they could 
learn more effectively. If possible learning should be like a game, in fact turning 
certain areas into games is widely held to be good practice-it is important that 
learning should never be a slow, difficult or onerous activity. Students should also be 
rewarded whenever possible (in the case of disaffected students you might reward 
them for not doing certain things-swearing, beating each other up etc.). Ultimately if 
an inspector came to watch your lesson she would hope to see most if not all of these 
things. Indeed, not only would the inspector not want to see mayhem within the 
classroom, rows of quiet attentive children would be almost as unacceptable-the 
students should be champing at the bit paralytic with excitement at the thought of 
being able to learn kinaesthetically or answer questions in brief speedy question and 
answer sessions. 
With all this in mind it seems slightly bizarre that anybody would want to 
introduce happiness lessons, given the fact that every lesson is supposed to promote 
happiness anyway. Of course happiness lessons are in keeping with this idea as they 
perhaps represent its intensification and thematisation. The kind of happiness at stake 
here seems quite in keeping with the vision of happiness that Judith Suissa's paper is 
critical of, and I believe has similar roots in positive psychology (Suissa, 2010). Here 
happiness is viewed as 'feeling good'. This can be empirically verified by watching 
the children's pleasure in learning and by asking them if they're enjoying themselves. 
There is a whole body of material on student voice that can supposedly verify all 
these things. As Suissa notes in her paper, this is an extremely limited conception of 
happiness-the cursory nods within positive psychology to philosophical thought 
about happiness fail to account for the ethical/philosophical dimension of that thought 
and therefore those areas pertaining to happiness that cannot be measured empirically. 
Though I find myself in agreement with much of what Suissa has to say in her 
critique of positive psychology I find that her account is perhaps simultaneously too 
close to and too distant from that psychology. I want to argue that this simultaneous 
closeness and difference belongs to the fact that both Suissa's paper and the positive 
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psychologists see education as inextricably bound up with the individual or the 'self', 
though their visions of that self are quite different. Also, are there ways in which both 
Suissa and the positive psychology approach are ahistorical that is to their detriment? 
Finally, I wish to suggest that both approaches are ultimately about mastery, although 
in Suissa's case this is a far more complex and appropriately troubled issue. 
Firstly, it seems that much of Suissa' s critique of positive psychology relies on the 
difference between the thin psychologists version of the self and the philosopher's or 
novelist's 'thick' 'textured' self. The positive psychologist's self is thin in the sense 
that the self is either a happy or unhappy organism that possesses skills that are 
somehow not integral to the self, but something that the self applies. In contrast 
Suissa's thick textured self admits all those difficult complicated areas of the lived life 
that are related to issues of ethical normativity-I am what I come to value and how I 
see the world, I am not simply some object that feels this way or that. This explains 
Suissa's question: 'Yet in what sense can forming and sustaining "productive 
relationships" or "caring for others" be described as skills?' Although I agree with 
Suissa that this seems terribly cold, the question should perhaps not only consider the 
'sense' that allows us to describe these things as skills, but also the historical 
background that provides this sense. In The Postmodern Condition (written in 1979) 
Lyotard maintains that the grand Enlightenment narratives of truth and justice have 
been superseded by the logic of performativity, in which everything becomes 
measurable in accordance with how effective or ineffective it is (Lyotard, 1984). 
Consequently, the tendency within educational studies to measure and test everything 
(to see if it works) ultimately makes sense. It equally makes sense to think of 
sustaining productive relationships in terms of skills-the bookshelves are full of 
manuals telling you how to do just that-there is nothing surprising about this-it is 
an historical phenomenon. Of course, it is perhaps philosophy's job to throw light on 
the thinness of this particular way of seeing the world. Indeed, I agree with Suissa's 
feelings of depression at the notion espoused by some psychologists that we should 
create a more equal society because this will make us feel better, but the kind of 
thoroughly postmodem way of viewing the world that it reflects unfortunately does 
make sense. Of course it also refuses its own historicity-the idea that a more just 
society makes us feel better is given a universal slant. So my question here has to do 
with how far these appeals to the self are ahistorical. 
There is another kind of universality present in Suissa's work and is perhaps what 
gives rise to her incredulity towards the claims discussed above. In Untimely 
Meditations Nietzsche writes: 'I enquire now as to the genesis of a philologist and 
assert the following': 
I. A young man cannot possibly know what Greeks and Romans are. 
II. He does not know whether he is suited for finding out about them. 
Let us consider the first point. A young man cannot possibly know what Greeks and 
Romans are because the kind of existence that they represent is in so many respects 
alien to us, yet one feels that for Suissa, Aristotle and Anna Karenina are being read 
as though they were our contemporaries. This is not to say that Aristotle is irrelevant, 
but no text can give us the texture of his life, however much we might wish it were 
otherwise. Anna Karenina is (obviously?) a fictional character, and Suissa's reading 
of Tolstoy is at times both moving and powerfully argued, though as I intend to show, 
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it may open doors to rooms that she or indeed we may not be suited to enter. In the 
meantime, it is necessary to say a bit more about this ahistorical approach to ethics 
and individuality that Suissa presents in her approach to literature. Since Tolstoy we 
have seen the dismantling of the omniscient narrator, empty existential figures such as 
Camus' outsider, the fractured world displayed in the fragments of T.S. Eliot's Waste 
Land, the confusion of Pynchon's hyperreal nightmarish worlds. The point here is not 
so much that the individual has become more complicated (messy?) as much as the 
ways of viewing and representing subjectivity have become so. Once acquainted with 
these forms of literary representation that have their philosophical/literary counter-
parts (the distinction between literature and philosophy has undergone deconstruction 
in some quarters) in the work of Levinas, Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze and many others 
it is difficult to see the individual in terms of completeness. However, for Suissa, the 
richly textured life is the 'complete' life. The 19th century realist novel gives voice to 
this impression of completeness. There is coherence to Tolstoy's characters however 
troubled they may be that allows us to get a grip on what's going on with them. They 
seem knowable to us because we are told what they are thinking. They are represented 
as 'complete' despite their possibly irrational messy behaviour. It is perhaps the 
continuing popularity of the realist novel, with its conservative indifference to 
groundbreaking shifts in the arts and philosophy that makes 19th century Russia and 
the heroes and heroines of its literature appear so knowable, so 'complete' to us now. 
This is perhaps a trick of history for they are not. I make these points in partial 
defence of the psychologists who Suissa feels ought to know more about Greek 
thought and the critiques of utilitarianism. Though I am not suggesting that she 
embrace the permutations of thought regarding subjectivity handled by the 
philosophers mentioned above, those permutations should perhaps be addressed. 
As already mentioned, Suissa's 'thick' individual is the 'complete' individual, but 
there seem to be certain tensions running through her paper as to what this amounts 
to. This is due, I think, to both her philosophical and literary choices and the particular 
aesthetics or phrasing of the piece. Let us begin with the kind of individual that 
emerges through the writing and its literary/philosophical nature. In certain respects 
Suissa's individual looks rather like a secularised version of Kierkegaard's authentic 
self-the one who pursues what matters to himlher rather than going after the 
meaning of life through some grand philosophical enterprise. However, at the same 
time, there are references to ethical normativity and it's asserted quite reasonably that 
'autonomy' is an important educational aim, yet 'autonomy' implies taking a distance 
from one's life and immediate concerns. By the same token, stylistically, Suissa's 
writing often embodies the measured analytic tone of the liberal philosophical 
tradition as she shows up the inconsistencies in the positive psychologists' arguments. 
This is also present in the discussion of Tolstoy, although in these sections, there is a 
certain discursive loosening up. So for example, the analytic discourse is in evidence 
when Suissa approaches Anna Karenina's life as a 'thought experiment' but loosens 
when she uses terms such as 'texture'. I am therefore suggesting that there are 
philosophical/aesthetic tensions in Suissa's writing. 
In the messier (to my mind the most interesting sections of Suissa's paper) 
Richard Smith's work on philosophy, literature and education makes an appearance. 
However, it seems that whereas what Suissa does with literature sometimes comes 
close to what Smith is about there are also important differences. On occasions, 
Suissa treats literature as a resource-an object that shows us 'complete' lives that we 
can use to help us be better (happier?) people. In contrast, this distinction between 
philosophy and literature is not so clearly drawn in Smith's account-philosophy is 
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literary-Plato's dialogues are simultaneously drama and argument and the two 
aspects cannot be separated. By the same token, there is an historical dimension that is 
often humorously dealt with in Smith's work. When for example he asks if Darcy 
from Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice should be thought of as a candidate for self-
esteem training we get the full flavour of an historical gap directing us to a time in 
which this question could not possibly make sense. We might also note that Smith's 
style is generally unapologetically literary, words are allowed to dance. There is a 
lightness of touch. These are not incidental factors that make the work more 
interesting to read but central components in a philosophical/literary vision. 
Ultimately what I am suggesting is that there is a Dionysian dimension to Smith's 
writing. Nietzsche often discussed the relationship between the Greek Gods Apollo 
and Dionysos, Apollo being representative of pure form, stillness, timelessness and 
perfect order, Dionysos, becoming and destruction. Let us return briefly to the second 
part of the Nietzsche quote in which a young man may not know if he is suited to 
finding out about the Greeks and Romans. Nietzsche is surely thinking here of the 
Dionysiac ritual in which people would enter into a trance, lose themselves in the 
dangerous sensual pleasures of the dance, become unhinged forfeit control and 
become animal, become intense. The experience of the Dionysian need not take this 
form-in fact it may take all manner of forms (which will in some way relate to our 
historical moment). One such form would involve reading. We often talk of losing 
ourselves in a book and losing oneself is integral to the Dionysian experience that is 
also an educational experience. Here education is not the education of the individual 
(for Suissa any form of education is the education of the individual) but accompanies 
the loss of individuality as we become intense in our reading. Of course in reading, 
Apollonian reason does not disappear from the scene, we interpret the words just as 
we get lost in them. There is a fusion of thought and feeling. If we think of literature 
in this way it does not provide us with 'thought experiments'. To experiment one 
must be outside, one must be a subject involved in an objective activity. 
The positive psychologists' focus on 'feeling' perhaps touches on some element of 
the Dionysian, but then there is a need to gain scientific mastery over 'feeling', 
measure it, imprison it and not allow it to go outside and dance. In contrast, a cold 
analytic philosophical approach to happiness will throw feeling aside in favour of 
thick conceptual arguments. I do not think that Suissa embraces this second approach 
whole-heartedly-the scent of existentialism about her article takes her away from 
this. By the same token, particularly towards the end of her piece, Suissa's writing 
promises to dance-the inclusion of the quotation about Levin has the promise of the 
dance about it. I am thinking here particularly of this passage: 'When Levin thought 
about what he was and why he lived, he could find no answer and was driven to 
despair: but when he left off asking himself those questions he seemed to know what 
he was and why he lived, so he acted unfalteringly and definitely ... '. This description 
of Levin's experience seems to have a Dionysian quality to it whereby he stops 
analysing his life in a detached fashion and begins to live intensely. There is a 
darkness surrounding his experience-the light of reason is no good to him. Levin 
does not understand how he is able to go on living but does so anyway. It is 
interesting that following the above quotation, Suissa asks a number of questions that 
patently cannot be answered-was it that Levin had not learnt the right happiness 
skills, would an informed use of CBT helped him out? Despite the historical 
implausibility of these questions (from the earnest tone I get no sense that the Darcy 
joke is in operation here) they gesture towards the dance as questioning is no longer 
appropriate. To get Levin at all we must go on the intense journey with him without 
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asking why. Of course, within the constraints of the realist novel, Tolstoy has already 
done a lot of the work for us. 
Finally, it should be noted that extended periods of reading are not encouraged in 
English lessons anymore. It apparently generates unhappiness. Make of that what you 
will. 
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